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Trends in Social Security Incentives in Belgium / Anne-Lore Fraikin, Alain Jousten, Mathieu Lefebvre.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w31552.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s): Other classification:
  • I30
  • J14
  • J26
Online resources: Available additional physical forms:
  • Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Abstract: In Belgium, a series of social security reforms have been implemented over the years with the overarching goal of increasing the labor force participation through better work incentives. Using individual-level administrative data, the paper studies the impact of those incentive-based reforms on observed changes in older workers' employment patterns. We investigate how social security incentives and particularly their changes over time can explain the retirement decision. We calculate indicators of benefit entitlement and derive retirement incentive measures. Using micro-estimation techniques, we find that more generous retirement provision contribute to earlier retirement. Counterfactual reform simulations show strongly incentivizing effects at lower ages and more mixed results at higher ages - particularly for men.
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August 2023.

In Belgium, a series of social security reforms have been implemented over the years with the overarching goal of increasing the labor force participation through better work incentives. Using individual-level administrative data, the paper studies the impact of those incentive-based reforms on observed changes in older workers' employment patterns. We investigate how social security incentives and particularly their changes over time can explain the retirement decision. We calculate indicators of benefit entitlement and derive retirement incentive measures. Using micro-estimation techniques, we find that more generous retirement provision contribute to earlier retirement. Counterfactual reform simulations show strongly incentivizing effects at lower ages and more mixed results at higher ages - particularly for men.

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