School Choice, Competition, and Aggregate School Quality / Michael Gilraine, Uros Petronijevic, John D. Singleton.

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Gilraine, Michael

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w31328.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: This paper develops and estimates an empirical framework that evaluates the impact of charter school choice on education quality in the aggregate. We estimate the model using student-level data from North Carolina. We find that North Carolina's lifting of its statewide charter school cap raised the average public school's value-added by around 0.01 standard deviations (on the student test score distribution). We calculate the total human capital returns of the expansion at above $100,000 per charter school enrollee. We further show that competition drives the aggregate gains; test score impacts on students induced into charter schools by the policy are negative.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w31328 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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June 2023.

This paper develops and estimates an empirical framework that evaluates the impact of charter school choice on education quality in the aggregate. We estimate the model using student-level data from North Carolina. We find that North Carolina's lifting of its statewide charter school cap raised the average public school's value-added by around 0.01 standard deviations (on the student test score distribution). We calculate the total human capital returns of the expansion at above $100,000 per charter school enrollee. We further show that competition drives the aggregate gains; test score impacts on students induced into charter schools by the policy are negative.