Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism? / Gustavo J. Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, Simeon Nichter.

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Bobonis, Gustavo J

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TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w31266.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Subject(s):

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Abstract: Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? We examine the impact of a prominent anti-corruption program on clientelism using a novel representative survey of rural Brazilians. Randomized audits reduce politicians' provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens' demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. With regards to mechanisms, audits undermine clientelist relationships by reducing citizens' interactions with politicians and their knowledge of incumbents. Furthermore, audits significantly deteriorate citizens' perceptions of politician reciprocity in a hypothetical trust game. Results also offer novel insights into audits' dynamic effects: they have more pronounced effects in the short run, especially during electoral periods.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w31266 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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May 2023.

Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? We examine the impact of a prominent anti-corruption program on clientelism using a novel representative survey of rural Brazilians. Randomized audits reduce politicians' provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens' demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. With regards to mechanisms, audits undermine clientelist relationships by reducing citizens' interactions with politicians and their knowledge of incumbents. Furthermore, audits significantly deteriorate citizens' perceptions of politician reciprocity in a hypothetical trust game. Results also offer novel insights into audits' dynamic effects: they have more pronounced effects in the short run, especially during electoral periods.