Representation Failure / Matias Iaryczower, Sergio Montero, Galileu Kim.
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- Estimation: General
- Estimation: General
- Econometrics of Games and Auctions
- Econometrics of Games and Auctions
- Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C13
- C57
- D7
- D72
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w29965 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
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April 2022.
Democratic representation is constrained by the alternatives available to voters. In this paper, we develop a methodology to gauge the extent to which the "supply side" of politics hinders voter welfare. Using rich data on thousands of candidates in three Brazilian legislative elections, we quantify the relative value voters place on candidates' policy positions and non-ideological attributes, and we evaluate voters' welfare given the set of candidates they face. Our estimates uncover substantial welfare losses to voters relative to three alternative benchmarks of ideal representation. On average, the typical voter suffers only a moderate loss due to policy incongruence but a large loss due to shortages in candidates' non-ideological characteristics. To evaluate the welfare consequences of potential institutional reforms, we develop and estimate a model of equilibrium policy determination. Through counterfactual experiments, we show that institutional reforms aimed at improving the quality of representation may have sizable unintended consequences due to equilibrium policy adjustments.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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