Laffont, Jean-Jacques,   1947-2004 <br/><br/>
A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation / 
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole. 
 - Cambridge :   The MIT Press,   1993. 
 - xxii, 705 páginas :   tablas, gráficas ;   26 cm. 
<br/><br/>Incluye bibliografías e índice. 
<br/><br/>Introduction -- I. Price and rate-of-return regulation ; 1. Cost-reimbursement rules ; 2. Pricing by a single-product firm with and without budget balance ; 3. Pricing and incentives in a multiproduct firm ; 4. Regulation of quality -- II: Product market competition ; 5. Competitive Ramsey formulas and access pricing ; 6. Bypass and cream skimming -- III: Bidding for natural monopoly ; 7. Auctioning incentive contracts ; 8. Repeated auctions of incentive contracts, investment, and bidding parity -- IV. The dynamics of regulation ; 9. Dynamics without commitment and the ratchet effect ; 10. Commitment and renegotiation -- V: The politics of regulation ; 11. Regulatory capture ; 12. Cost padding, auditing, and collusion ; 13. Cartelization by regulation ; 14. Auction design and favoritism -- VI: Regulatory institutions ; 15. Regulatory instruments, hearings, and interest group monitoring ; 16. Commitment and political accountability ; 17. Privatization and incentives. 
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>0262121743 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Empresas de servicios públicos
<br/><br/><label>Dewey Class. No.: </label>338.82   / L13t