Political transformations and public finances : Europe, 1650-1913 /
Mark Dincecco.
- Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- xii, 233 páginas : tablas, gráficas ; 24 cm.
- Political economy of institutions and decisions .
Incluye referencias bibliográficas (páginas 209-221) e índice.
1. Weak and strong states in historical perspective: 1.1. Fiscal fundamentals ; 1.2. The approach ; 1.3. Overview of contents -- 2. Gaining force: 2.1. The fragmented old regime ; 2.2. Quantitative analysis ; 2.3. Centralization after 1789 ; 2.4. Coding centralization -- 3. Restricting power: 3.1. Predatory kings ; 3.2. The fiscal supremacy of parliament ; 3.3. Coding limited government -- 4. Political regimes and credit risk: 4.1. Regimes and risk: theory ; 4.2. The data ; 4.3. Regimes and risk: case-study evidence ; 5. Two mechanisms: 5.1. Regimes, revenues, and prudence: theory ; 5.2. The data ; 5.3. Regimes, revenues, and prudence: case-study evidence ; 5.4. Prussia as an anomaly -- 6. Letting the data speak for themselves: 6.1. Structural breaks basics; 6.2. sovereign credit risk: results ; 6.3. Two mechanisms: results -- 7. Estimating the fiscal effects of political regimes: 7.1. Econometric basics ; 7.2. Sovereign credit risk: results ; 7.3. Two mechanisms: results -- 8. The institutional balance of modern fiscal states: 8.1. Assessment of findings ; 8.2. The changing role of government ; 8.3. Historical lessons for development ; 8.4. The future of entitlements.