Miller, Amalia R. <br/><br/>
Does Workplace Competition Increase Labor Supply? Evidence from a Field Experiment / 
Amalia R. Miller, Ragan Petrie, Carmit Segal. 
 - Cambridge, Mass.  National Bureau of Economic Research  2019. 
 - 1 online resource:  illustrations (black and white); 
 - NBER working paper series  no. w25948 .
 - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)  no. w25948. .
<br/><br/> June 2019. 
<br/><br/> This paper develops a novel field experiment to test the implicit prediction of tournament theory that competition increases work time and can therefore contribute to the long work hours required in elite occupations. A majority of workers in the treatment without explicit financial incentives worked past the minimum time, but awarding a tournament prize increased work time and effort by over 80% and lowered costs of effort or output by over a third. Effort was similar with alternative (piece rate, low-prize tournament) bonuses. Men worked longer than women in the high-prize tournament, but for the same duration in other treatments. 
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