TY  - BOOK
AU  - Benson,Alan
AU  - Li,Danielle
AU  - Shue,Kelly
ED  - National Bureau of Economic Research.
TI  - Promotions and the Peter Principle
T2  - NBER working paper series
PY  - 2018///
CY  - Cambridge, Mass.
PB  - National Bureau of Economic Research
N1  - February 2018; Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
N2  - The best worker is not always the best candidate for manager.  In these cases, do firms promote the best potential manager or the best worker in her current job? Using microdata on the performance of sales workers at 214 firms, we find evidence consistent with the "Peter Principle," which predicts that firms prioritize current job performance in promotion decisions at the expense of other observable characteristics that better predict managerial performance.  We estimate that the costs of promoting workers with lower managerial potential are high, suggesting either that firms are making inefficient promotion decisions or that  the benefits of promotion-based incentives are great enough to justify the costs of managerial mismatch
UR  - https://www.nber.org/papers/w24343
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24343
ER  -