TY  - BOOK
AU  - Casaburi,Lorenzo
AU  - Troiano,Ugo
ED  - National Bureau of Economic Research.
TI  - Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program 
T2  - NBER working paper series
PY  - 2015///
CY  - Cambridge, Mass.
PB  - National Bureau of Economic Research
N1  - May 2015; Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
N2  - The incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants of the levels of compliance. We study the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings program, a nationwide anti-tax evasion policy in Italy that used innovative monitoring technologies to target buildings hidden from tax authorities. The program induced monetary and non-monetary benefits for non-evaders. A one standard deviation increase in town-level program intensity leads to a 4.8 percent increase in local incumbent reelection rates. In addition, these political returns are higher in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher efficiency of public good provision, implying complementarity among enforcement policies, the underlying tax culture, and the quality of the government
UR  - https://www.nber.org/papers/w21185
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21185
ER  -