Aruoba, S. Borağan. <br/><br/>
A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability / 
S. Borağan Aruoba, Allan Drazen, Razvan Vlaicu. 
 - Cambridge, Mass.  National Bureau of Economic Research  2015. 
 - 1 online resource:  illustrations (black and white); 
 - NBER working paper series  no. w21151 .
 - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)  no. w21151. .
<br/><br/> May 2015. 
<br/><br/> This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors for 1982-2012. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort. We also find a selection effect, although it is weaker in terms of its effect on average governor performance. According to our model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4.2% compared to a one-term regime, and find that a three-term regime may improve voter welfare even further. 
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