Pool, Veronika K. <br/><br/>
It Pays to Set the Menu:  Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans / 
Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm, Irina Stefanescu. 
 - Cambridge, Mass.  National Bureau of Economic Research  2013. 
 - 1 online resource:  illustrations (black and white); 
 - NBER working paper series  no. w18764 .
 - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)  no. w18764. .
<br/><br/> February 2013. 
<br/><br/> This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as trustees of 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own funds. Using a hand-collected dataset on retirement investment options, we show that poorly-performing funds are less likely to be removed from and more likely to be added to a 401(k) menu if they are affiliated with the plan trustee. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, the subsequent performance of poorly-performing affiliated funds indicates that these trustee decisions are not information driven and are costly to retirement savers. 
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