Alesina, Alberto F. <br/><br/>
The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments / 
Alberto F. Alesina, Dorian Carloni, Giampaolo Lecce. 
 - Cambridge, Mass.  National Bureau of Economic Research  2011. 
 - 1 online resource:  illustrations (black and white); 
 - NBER working paper series  no. w17655 .
 - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)  no. w17655. .
<br/><br/> December 2011. 
<br/><br/> The conventional wisdom regarding the political consequences of large reductions of budget deficits is that they are very costly for the governments which implement them: they are punished by voters at the following elections. In the present paper, instead, we find no evidence that governments which quickly reduce budget deficits are systematically voted out of office in a sample of 19 OECD countries from 1975 to 2008.  We also take into consideration issues of reverse causality, namely the possibility that only "strong and popular" governments can implement fiscal adjustments and thus they are not voted out of office "despite" having reduced the deficits.  In the end we conclude that many governments can reduce deficits avoiding an electoral defeat. 
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