TY  - BOOK
AU  - Asker,John
AU  - Bar-Isaac,Heski
ED  - National Bureau of Economic Research.
TI  - Exclusionary Minimum Resale Price Maintenance
T2  - NBER working paper series
PY  - 2010///
CY  - Cambridge, Mass.
PB  - National Bureau of Economic Research
N1  - December 2010; Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
N2  - An upstream manufacturer can use minimum retail price maintenance (RPM) to exclude potential competitors. RPM lets the incumbent manufacturer transfer profits to retailers. If entry is accommodated, upstream competition leads to fierce down- stream competition and the breakdown of RPM. Hence, via RPM, retailers internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent's profits. Retailers may prefer not to accommodate entry; and, if entry requires downstream accommodation, entry can be deterred. We investigate when an incumbent would prefer to exclude, rather than collude with, the entrant and the effect of a retailer cartel. We also consider the effect of imperfect competition. Empirical and policy implications are discussed
UR  - https://www.nber.org/papers/w16564
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w16564
ER  -