TY  - BOOK
AU  - Abdulkadiroglu,Atila
AU  - Pathak,Parag A.
AU  - Roth,Alvin E.
ED  - National Bureau of Economic Research.
TI  - Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match 
T2  - NBER working paper series
PY  - 2009///
CY  - Cambridge, Mass.
PB  - National Bureau of Economic Research
N1  - April 2009; Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
N2  - The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school --single tie breaking-- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions
UR  - https://www.nber.org/papers/w14864
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14864
ER  -