TY  - BOOK
AU  - Bajari,Patrick
AU  - Hong,Han
AU  - Khwaja,Ahmed
ED  - National Bureau of Economic Research.
TI  - Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis 
T2  - NBER working paper series
PY  - 2006///
CY  - Cambridge, Mass.
PB  - National Bureau of Economic Research
N1  - August 2006; Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
N2  - Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We empirically study this question by using data from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate a structural model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. Using a two-step semi-parametric estimation strategy we find significant evidence of moral hazard, but not of adverse selection
UR  - https://www.nber.org/papers/w12445
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12445
ER  -