Porta, Rafael La. <br/><br/>
Investor Protection:  Origins, Consequences, and Reform / 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. 
 - Cambridge, Mass.  National Bureau of Economic Research  1999. 
 - 1 online resource:  illustrations (black and white); 
 - NBER working paper series  no. w7428 .
 - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)  no. w7428. .
<br/><br/> December 1999. 
<br/><br/> Recent research has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance.  We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms.  We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform.  We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems. 
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