Gibbons, Robert. <br/><br/>
Incentives and Careers in Organizations / 
Robert Gibbons. 
 - Cambridge, Mass.  National Bureau of Economic Research  1996. 
 - 1 online resource:  illustrations (black and white); 
 - NBER working paper series  no. w5705 .
 - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)  no. w5705. .
<br/><br/> August 1996. 
<br/><br/> This paper surveys two related pieces of the labor-economics literature:  incentive pay and careers in organizations.  In the discussion of incentives, I first summarize theory and evidence related to the classic agency model, which emphasizes the tradeoff between insurance and incentives.  I then offer econometric and case-study evidence suggesting that this classic model ignores several crucial issues and sketch new models that begin to analyze these issues.  In the discussion of careers in organizations, I begin by summarizing evidence on wages and positions using panel data within firms.  This evidence is sparse and far-flung (drawn from industrial relations, organizational behavior, and sociology, as well as from labor economics); I identify ten basic questions that merit more systematic investigation.  Turning to theory, I describe building-block models that address one or a few pieces of evidence, but focus on more recent models that address broad patterns of evidence. 
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