Kaplow, Louis. <br/><br/>
Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior / 
Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell. 
 - Cambridge, Mass.  National Bureau of Economic Research  1991. 
 - 1 online resource:  illustrations (black and white); 
 - NBER working paper series  no. w3822 .
 - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)  no. w3822. .
<br/><br/> August 1991. 
<br/><br/> Self-reporting -- the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority -- is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement. Optimal self-reporting schemes are characterized and are shown to offer two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because individuals who are led to report harmful acts need not be identified; risk is reduced because individuals bear certain sanctions when they report their behavior, rather than face uncertain sanctions. 
<br/><br/>
<br/><br/><br/>System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. <br/>Mode of access: World Wide Web.