TY  - BOOK
AU  - Kaplow,Louis
AU  - Shavell,Steven
ED  - National Bureau of Economic Research.
TI  - Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior
T2  - NBER working paper series
PY  - 1991///
CY  - Cambridge, Mass.
PB  - National Bureau of Economic Research
N1  - August 1991; Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
N2  - Self-reporting -- the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority -- is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement. Optimal self-reporting schemes are characterized and are shown to offer two advantages over schemes without self-reporting: enforcement resources are saved because individuals who are led to report harmful acts need not be identified; risk is reduced because individuals bear certain sanctions when they report their behavior, rather than face uncertain sanctions
UR  - https://www.nber.org/papers/w3822
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3822
ER  -