TY  - BOOK
AU  - Del Angel,Marco
AU  - Richardson,Gary
ED  - National Bureau of Economic Research.
TI  - Independent Regulators and Financial Stability: Evidence from Gubernatorial Campaigns and a Progressive Era Policy Experiment 
T2  - NBER working paper series
PY  - 2022///
CY  - Cambridge, Mass.
PB  - National Bureau of Economic Research
N1  - April 2022; Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
N2  - Regulatory independence forms a foundation for modern financial systems. To illuminate the value of this ubiquitous institution, we examine a Progressive Era policy experiment in which hitherto independent regulators came under gubernatorial supervision. After this change, failure rates declined during gubernatorial election campaigns for banks under gubernatorial jurisdiction. Declines did not occur during campaigns for other officials or for nationally chartered banks. Declines in bank resolutions during campaigns reduced business bankruptcies. We corroborate these claims with new data and novel IV regressions. Our results indicate that political subservience of financial regulators links electoral and economic cycles
UR  - https://www.nber.org/papers/w29938
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w29938
ER  -