Iaryczower, Matias. <br/><br/>
Collaboration Between and Within Groups / 
Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros, Parth Parihar. 
 - Cambridge, Mass.  National Bureau of Economic Research  2022. 
 - 1 online resource:  illustrations (black and white); 
 - NBER working paper series  no. w30656 .
 - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)  no. w30656. .
<br/><br/> November 2022. 
<br/><br/> We study the ability of multi-group teams to undertake binary projects in a decentralized environment. The equilibrium outcomes of our model display familiar features in collaborative settings, including inefficient gradualism, inaction, and contribution cycles, wherein groups alternate taking responsibility for moving the project forward. Expected delay grows more than proportionally with project size, and some welfare-enhancing projects are not completed, even as agents become arbitrarily patient. A team composed of two equally large groups can complete larger projects than a fully homogenous team, even as the difference in preferences for completion among the two groups is arbitrarily small. Moreover, if the project is sufficiently large, the two-group team always completes the project strictly faster. 
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<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Noncooperative Games<br/>Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior