Competitive Model Selection in Algorithmic Targeting /
Ganesh Iyer, T. Tony Ke.
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2023.
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- NBER working paper series no. w31002 .
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w31002. .
March 2023.
This paper studies how market competition influences the algorithmic design choices of firms in the context of targeting. Firms face the general trade-off between bias and variance when choosing the design of a supervised learning algorithm in terms of model complexity or the number of predictors to accommodate. Each firm then appoints a data analyst that uses the chosen algorithm to estimate demand for multiple consumer segments, based on which, it devises a targeting policy to maximize estimated profit. We show that competition may induce firms to strategically choose simpler algorithms which involve more bias. This implies that more complex/flexible algorithms tend to have higher value for firms with greater monopoly power.
System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets Advertising