Bobonis, Gustavo J. <br/><br/>
Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism? / 
Gustavo J. Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, Simeon Nichter. 
 - Cambridge, Mass.  National Bureau of Economic Research  2023. 
 - 1 online resource:  illustrations (black and white); 
 - NBER working paper series  no. w31266 .
 - Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)  no. w31266. .
<br/><br/> May 2023. 
<br/><br/> Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? We examine the impact of a prominent anti-corruption program on clientelism using a novel representative survey of rural Brazilians. Randomized audits reduce politicians' provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens' demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. With regards to mechanisms, audits undermine clientelist relationships by reducing citizens' interactions with politicians and their knowledge of incumbents. Furthermore, audits significantly deteriorate citizens' perceptions of politician reciprocity in a hypothetical trust game. Results also offer novel insights into audits' dynamic effects: they have more pronounced effects in the short run, especially during electoral periods. 
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<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>General<br/>Legal Institutions &bull; Illegal Behavior