TY  - BOOK
AU  - Bobonis,Gustavo J.
AU  - Gertler,Paul
AU  - Gonzalez-Navarro,Marco
AU  - Nichter,Simeon
ED  - National Bureau of Economic Research.
TI  - Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism?
T2  - NBER working paper series
PY  - 2023///
CY  - Cambridge, Mass.
PB  - National Bureau of Economic Research
KW  - General
KW  - jelc
KW  - Legal Institutions • Illegal Behavior
N1  - May 2023; Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
N2  - Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? We examine the impact of a prominent anti-corruption program on clientelism using a novel representative survey of rural Brazilians. Randomized audits reduce politicians' provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens' demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. With regards to mechanisms, audits undermine clientelist relationships by reducing citizens' interactions with politicians and their knowledge of incumbents. Furthermore, audits significantly deteriorate citizens' perceptions of politician reciprocity in a hypothetical trust game. Results also offer novel insights into audits' dynamic effects: they have more pronounced effects in the short run, especially during electoral periods
UR  - https://www.nber.org/papers/w31266
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w31266
ER  -