Frames, Incentives, and Education: Effectiveness of Interventions to Delay Public Pension Claiming / Franca Glenzer, Pierre-Carl Michaud, Stefan Staubli.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- G53
- J26
- Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Working Paper | Biblioteca Digital | Colección NBER | nber w30938 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Not For Loan |
February 2023.
Many people forgo a higher stream of public pension income by claiming early. We provide both quasi-experimental and survey-experimental evidence that the timing of public pension claiming is relatively inelastic to changes in financial incentives in Canada. Using the survey experiment, we evaluate the effect of two different educational interventions and different ways of framing the incentive to delay claiming. While all three types of interventions induce delays, these interventions have heterogeneous financial consequences for participants who react.
Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
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