Qualitative Information, Reputation, and Monopolistic Competition / Michael R. Darby, John R. Lott, Jr..

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Darby, Michael R

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; no. w0095.Publication details: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1975.Description: 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white)Online resources:

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Abstract: Much recent research in the economics of information has analyzed the implications of alternative market structures in the presence of qualitative characteristics which cannot be accurately and objectively measured or described. This approach avoids the more basic question of the influence of qualitative information on the emergence of market structures. This paper argues that market structures arise which minimize total average production and information costs and that qualitative characteristics produce structures utilizing reputation.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Working Paper	Biblioteca Digital	Colección NBER	nber w0095 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Not For Loan

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July 1975.

Much recent research in the economics of information has analyzed the implications of alternative market structures in the presence of qualitative characteristics which cannot be accurately and objectively measured or described. This approach avoids the more basic question of the influence of qualitative information on the emergence of market structures. This paper argues that market structures arise which minimize total average production and information costs and that qualitative characteristics produce structures utilizing reputation.