000			03198cam a22003617 4500
001			w28403
003			NBER
005			20211020103324.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2021 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aJia, Ruixue.
245	1	2	_aA Theory of Power Structure and Institutional Compatibility: _bChina vs. Europe Revisited / _cRuixue Jia, Gérard Roland, Yang Xie.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2021.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w28403
500			_aJanuary 2021.
520	3		_aDespite a large consensus among economists on the strong interdependence and synergy between pro-development institutions, how should one understand why Imperial China, with weaker rule of law and property rights, gave the commoners more opportunities to access elite status than Premodern Europe, for example via the civil service exam and the absence of hereditary titles? Supported by rich historical narratives, we show that these institutional differences reflect more general differences in the power structure of society: (1) the Ruler enjoyed weaker absolute power in Europe; (2) the People were more on par with the Elites in China in terms of power and rights. Based on these narratives, we build a game-theoretical model and analyze how the power structure can shape the stability of an autocratic rule. If we read greater absolute power of the Ruler as conditioning more of the power and rights of the ruled on the Ruler's will, we show that a more symmetric Elite-People relationship can stabilize autocratic rule. If absolute power is stronger, this stabilizing effect will be stronger, and the Ruler's incentive to promote such symmetry will be greater. The theory explains the power structure differences between Imperial China and Premodern Europe, as well as specific institutions such as the bureaucracy in China and the role of cities in Europe. It is also consistent with the observation that autocratic rule was more stable in Imperial China than in Premodern Europe.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aN40 - General, International, or Comparative _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aO17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aP48 - Political Economy • Legal Institutions • Property Rights • Natural Resources • Energy • Environment • Regional Studies _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aRoland, Gérard.
700	1		_aXie, Yang.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w28403.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w28403
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28403
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c319719 _d278281