000 02328cam a22003977 4500
001 w28272
003 NBER
005 20211020103354.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu||||||||
008 210910s2020 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100 1 _aSweeting, Andrew.
_933207
245 1 0 _aDynamic Price Competition, Learning-By-Doing and Strategic Buyers /
_cAndrew Sweeting, Dun Jia, Shen Hui, Xinlu Yao.
260 _aCambridge, Mass.
_bNational Bureau of Economic Research
_c2020.
300 _a1 online resource:
_billustrations (black and white);
490 1 _aNBER working paper series
_vno. w28272
500 _aDecember 2020.
520 3 _aWe generalize recent models of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing for long-lived strategic buyers, with a single parameter capturing the extent to which each buyer internalizes future buyer surplus. Many of the equilibria that exist when buyers are atomistic or myopic are eliminated when buyers internalize even a modest share of their effects on future surplus. The equilibria that survive tend to be those where long-run market competition is preserved.
530 _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538 _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588 0 _aPrint version record
690 7 _aC73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aD21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aD43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aL13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aL41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700 1 _aJia, Dun.
700 1 _aHui, Shen.
700 1 _aYao, Xinlu.
710 2 _aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 _aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)
_vno. w28272.
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w28272
856 _yAcceso en lĂ­nea al DOI
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28272
942 _2ddc
_cW-PAPER
999 _c319850
_d278412