000 02512cam a22003497 4500
001 w26969
003 NBER
005 20211020103809.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu||||||||
008 210910s2020 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100 1 _aClemens, Jeffrey.
245 1 0 _aUnderstanding “Wage Theft”:
_bEvasion and Avoidance Responses to Minimum Wage Increases /
_cJeffrey Clemens, Michael R. Strain.
260 _aCambridge, Mass.
_bNational Bureau of Economic Research
_c2020.
300 _a1 online resource:
_billustrations (black and white);
490 1 _aNBER working paper series
_vno. w26969
500 _aApril 2020.
520 3 _aA holistic assessment of the labor market effects of minimum wage regulation requires understanding employer compliance. We investigate how minimum wage increases and the strength of enforcement regimes affect the prevalence of subminimum wage payment. Using the Current Population Survey (CPS), we find strong evidence that higher minimum wages lead to a greater prevalence of subminimum wage payment. We estimate that increases in measured underpayment following minimum wage increases average between 14 and 22 percent of realized wage gains. Furthermore, we provide evidence that these estimates are unlikely to be driven by measurement error in the CPS's wage data, which are self-reported. Taken together, we interpret these findings as evidence that minimum wage noncompliance is an important reality in the low-wage labor market. We find some evidence that enforcement regimes mediate both baseline rates of subminimum wage payment and the response of subminimum wage payment to increases in minimum wages.
530 _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538 _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588 0 _aPrint version record
690 7 _aJ08 - Labor Economics Policies
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aJ38 - Public Policy
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aK42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700 1 _aStrain, Michael R.
710 2 _aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 _aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)
_vno. w26969.
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w26969
856 _yAcceso en línea al DOI
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26969
942 _2ddc
_cW-PAPER
999 _c321154
_d279716