000			03190cam a22004097 4500
001			w26171
003			NBER
005			20211020104041.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2019 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aBebchuk, Lucian A.
245	1	0	_aDancing With Activists / _cLucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Thomas Keusch.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2019.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w26171
500			_aAugust 2019.
520	3		_aAn important milestone often reached in the life of an activist engagement is entering into a "settlement" agreement between the activist and the target's board. Using a comprehensive hand-collected data set, we analyze the drivers, nature, and consequences of such settlement agreements. Settlements are more likely when the activist has a credible threat to win board seats in a proxy fight and when incumbents' reputation concerns are stronger. Consistent with incomplete contracting, face-saving benefits and private information considerations, settlements commonly do not contract directly on operational or leadership changes sought by the activist but rather on board composition changes. Settlements are accompanied by positive stock price reactions, and they are subsequently followed by changes of the type sought by activists, including CEO turnover, higher shareholder payouts, and improved operating performance. We find no evidence to support concerns that settlements enable activists to extract rents at the expense of other investors. Our analysis provides a look into the "black box" of activist engagements and contributes to understanding how activism brings about changes in target companies.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aG12 - Asset Pricing • Trading Volume • Bond Interest Rates _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG23 - Non-bank Financial Institutions • Financial Instruments • Institutional Investors _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG32 - Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG35 - Payout Policy _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG38 - Government Policy and Regulation _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aK22 - Business and Securities Law _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aBrav, Alon. _96777
700	1		_aJiang, Wei.
700	1		_aKeusch, Thomas.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w26171.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w26171
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26171
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c321951 _d280513