000			02944cam a22003857 4500
001			w26161
003			NBER
005			20211020104045.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2019 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aCarrera, Mariana.
245	1	0	_aWho Chooses Commitment? Evidence and Welfare Implications / _cMariana Carrera, Heather Royer, Mark Stehr, Justin Sydnor, Dmitry Taubinsky.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2019.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w26161
500			_aAugust 2019.
520	3		_aThis paper investigates whether offers of commitment contracts, in the form of self-imposed choice-set restrictions and penalties with no financial upside, are well-targeted tools for addressing self-control problems. In an experiment on gym attendance (N= 1;248), we examine take-up of commitment contracts, and also introduce a separate elicitation task to identify actual and perceived time inconsistency. There is high take-up of commitment contracts for greater gym attendance, resulting in significant increases in exercise. However, this is take-up is influenced both by noisy valuation and incorrect beliefs about one's time inconsistency. Approximately half of the people who take up commitment contracts for higher gym attendance also take up commitment contracts for lower gym attendance. There is little association between commitment contract take-up and reduced-form and structural estimates of actual or perceived time inconsistency. A novel information treatment providing an exogenous shock to awareness of time inconsistency reduces demand for commitment contracts. Structural estimates of a model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and gym attendance imply that offering our commitment contracts lowers consumer surplus, and is less socially efficient than utilizing linear exercise subsidies that achieve the same average change in behavior.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aC9 - Design of Experiments _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aD9 - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aI12 - Health Behavior _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aRoyer, Heather.
700	1		_aStehr, Mark.
700	1		_aSydnor, Justin.
700	1		_aTaubinsky, Dmitry.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w26161.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w26161
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26161
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c321961 _d280523