000 | 03245cam a22004217 4500 | ||
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001 | w25925 | ||
003 | NBER | ||
005 | 20211020104132.0 | ||
006 | m o d | ||
007 | cr cnu|||||||| | ||
008 | 210910s2019 mau fo 000 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 |
_aCampante, Filipe R. _97282 |
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245 | 1 | 4 |
_aThe Political Economy Consequences of China's Export Slowdown / _cFilipe R. Campante, Davin Chor, Bingjing Li. |
260 |
_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2019. |
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300 |
_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white); |
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490 | 1 |
_aNBER working paper series _vno. w25925 |
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500 | _aJune 2019. | ||
520 | 3 | _aWe study how adverse economic shocks influence political outcomes in authoritarian regimes in strong states, by examining the 2013-2015 export slowdown in China. We exploit detailed customs data and the variation they reveal about Chinese prefectures' underlying exposure to the global trade slowdown, in order to implement a shift-share instrumental variables strategy. Prefectures that experienced a more severe export slowdown witnessed a significant increase in incidents of labor strikes. This was accompanied by a heightened emphasis in such prefectures on upholding domestic stability, as evidenced from: (i) textual analysis measures we constructed from official annual work reports using machine-learning algorithms; and (ii) data we gathered on local fiscal expenditures channelled towards public security uses and social spending. The central government was subsequently more likely to replace the party secretary in prefectures that saw a high level of "excess strikes", above what could be predicted from the observed export slowdown, suggesting that local leaders were held to account on yardsticks related to political stability. | |
530 | _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers | ||
538 | _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. | ||
538 | _aMode of access: World Wide Web. | ||
588 | 0 | _aPrint version record | |
690 | 7 |
_aD73 - Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aD74 - Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • Revolutions _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aF10 - General _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aF14 - Empirical Studies of Trade _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aF16 - Trade and Labor Market Interactions _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aH10 - General _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aJ52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation • Collective Bargaining _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aP26 - Political Economy • Property Rights _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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700 | 1 |
_aChor, Davin. _98011 |
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700 | 1 | _aLi, Bingjing. | |
710 | 2 | _aNational Bureau of Economic Research. | |
830 | 0 |
_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w25925. |
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856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25925 |
856 |
_yAcceso en lĂnea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25925 |
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942 |
_2ddc _cW-PAPER |
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_c322197 _d280759 |