000			02169cam a22003497 4500
001			w25450
003			NBER
005			20211020104303.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2019 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aHartman-Glaser, Barney.
245	1	4	_aThe Insurance is the Lemon: _bFailing to Index Contracts / _cBarney Hartman-Glaser, Benjamin M. Hébert.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2019.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w25450
500			_aJanuary 2019.
520	3		_aWe model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index. The lender has private information about the ability of this index to measure the true state that the borrower would like to hedge. The lender is risk averse and thus requires a premium to insure the borrower. The borrower, however, might be paying something for nothing if the index is a poor measure of the true state. We provide sufficient conditions for this effect to cause the borrower to choose a non-indexed contract instead.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aD82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aD86 - Economics of Contract: Theory _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aHébert, Benjamin M.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w25450.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w25450
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25450
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c322672 _d281234