| 000 | 02389cam a22003497 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | w24627 | ||
| 003 | NBER | ||
| 005 | 20211020104532.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr cnu|||||||| | ||
| 008 | 210910s2018 mau fo 000 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 | _aEspinosa, Francisco. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aNoisy Agents / _cFrancisco Espinosa, Debraj Ray. |
| 260 |
_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2018. |
||
| 300 |
_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white); |
||
| 490 | 1 |
_aNBER working paper series _vno. w24627 |
|
| 500 | _aMay 2018. | ||
| 520 | 3 | _aAgents signal their type in a principal-agent model; the principal seeks to retain good agents. Types are signaled with some ambient noise. Agents can choose to add or remove additional noise at a cost. It is shown that monotone retention strategies, in which the principal keeps the agent if the signal crosses some threshold, are generically never equilibria. The main result identifies an equilibrium with a bounded retention zone, in which the principal is wary of both excessively good and excessively bad signals: she retains the agent if the signal is "moderate" and replaces him otherwise. The equilibria we uncover are robust to various extensions: non-normal signal structures, non-binary types, interacting agents, costly mean-shifting, or dynamics with term limits. We discuss applications to risky portfolio management, fake news and noisy government statistics. | |
| 530 | _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers | ||
| 538 | _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. | ||
| 538 | _aMode of access: World Wide Web. | ||
| 588 | 0 | _aPrint version record | |
| 690 | 7 |
_aD72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
|
| 690 | 7 |
_aD82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
|
| 690 | 7 |
_aD86 - Economics of Contract: Theory _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
|
| 700 | 1 |
_aRay, Debraj. _919180 |
|
| 710 | 2 | _aNational Bureau of Economic Research. | |
| 830 | 0 |
_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w24627. |
|
| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w24627 |
| 856 |
_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24627 |
||
| 942 |
_2ddc _cW-PAPER |
||
| 999 |
_c323495 _d282057 |
||