000			02717cam a22003737 4500
001			w22966
003			NBER
005			20211020105042.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2016 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aCameron, Charles M.
245	1	0	_aPublic Sector Personnel Economics: _bWages, Promotions, and the Competence-Control Trade-off / _cCharles M. Cameron, John M. de Figueiredo, David E. Lewis.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2016.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w22966
500			_aDecember 2016.
520	3		_aWe model personnel policies in public agencies, examining how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and develop policy projects. However, doing so requires internal personnel policies that sort "slackers" from "zealots." Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Finally, even with well-designed personnel policies, there remains an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aH11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aJ24 - Human Capital • Skills • Occupational Choice • Labor Productivity _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aJ45 - Public Sector Labor Markets _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aK2 - Regulation and Business Law _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_ade Figueiredo, John M.
700	1		_aLewis, David E.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w22966.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22966
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22966
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c325156 _d283718