000			02122cam a22003497 4500
001			w22768
003			NBER
005			20211020105121.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2016 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aLerner, Josh. _915166
245	1	0	_aPatent Disclosures and Standard-Setting / _cJosh Lerner, Haris Tabakovic, Jean Tirole.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2016.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w22768
500			_aOctober 2016.
520	3		_aA key role of standard setting organizations (SSOs) is to aggregate information on relevant intellectual property (IP) claims before deciding on a standard. This article explores the firms' strategies in response to IP disclosure requirements--in particular, the choice between specific and generic disclosures of IP--and the optimal response by SSOs, including the royalty rate setting. We show that firms with a stronger downstream presence are more likely to opt for a generic disclosure, as are those with lower quality patents. We empirically examine patent disclosures made to seven large SSOs, and find results consistent with theoretical predictions.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aL24 - Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology Licensing _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aO34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aTabakovic, Haris.
700	1		_aTirole, Jean. _921715
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w22768.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w22768
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22768
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c325354 _d283916