000 02517cam a22003137 4500
001 w21878
003 NBER
005 20211020105403.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu||||||||
008 210910s2016 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100 1 _aFrankel, Jeffrey A.
_910692
245 1 0 _aInternational Coordination /
_cJeffrey A. Frankel.
260 _aCambridge, Mass.
_bNational Bureau of Economic Research
_c2016.
300 _a1 online resource:
_billustrations (black and white);
490 1 _aNBER working paper series
_vno. w21878
500 _aJanuary 2016.
520 3 _aAfter a 30-year absence, calls for international coordination of macroeconomic policy are back. This time the issues go by names like currency wars, taper tantrums, and fiscal compacts. In traditional game theory terms, the existence of spillovers implies that countries are potentially better off if they coordinate policies than under the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. But what is the nature of the spillover and the coordination? The paper interprets recent macroeconomic history in terms of four possible frameworks for proposals to coordinate fiscal policy or monetary policy: the locomotive game, the discipline game, the competitive depreciation game and the competitive appreciation game. (The paper also considers claims that monetary coordination has been made necessary by the zero lower bound among advanced countries or financial imperfections among emerging markets.) Perceptions of the sign of spillovers and the direction of proposed coordination vary widely. The existence of different models and different domestic interests may be as important as the difference between cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. In some cases complaints about foreigners' actions and calls for cooperation may obscure the need to settle domestic disagreements.
530 _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538 _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588 0 _aPrint version record
690 7 _aF42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
710 2 _aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 _aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)
_vno. w21878.
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w21878
856 _yAcceso en lĂ­nea al DOI
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21878
942 _2ddc
_cW-PAPER
999 _c326244
_d284806