000			03006cam a22003857 4500
001			w21304
003			NBER
005			20211020105556.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2015 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aEinav, Liran. _928975
245	1	0	_aBeyond Statistics: _bThe Economic Content of Risk Scores / _cLiran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Raymond Kluender, Paul Schrimpf.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2015.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w21304
500			_aJune 2015.
520	3		_aIn recent years, the increased use of "big data" and statistical techniques to score potential transactions has transformed the operation of insurance and credit markets. In this paper, we observe that these widely-used scores are statistical objects that constitute a one-dimensional summary of a potentially much richer heterogeneity, some of which may be endogenous to the specific context in which they are applied. We demonstrate this point empirically using rich data from the Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance program. We show that the "risk scores," which are designed to predict an individualʼs drug spending and are used by Medicare to customize reimbursement rates to private insurers, do not distinguish between two different sources of spending: underlying health, and responsiveness of drug spending to the insurance contract. Naturally, however, these two determinants of spending have very different implications when trying to predict counterfactual spending under alternative contracts. As a result, we illustrate that once we enrich the theoretical framework to allow individuals to have heterogeneous behavioral responses to the contract, strategic incentives for cream skimming still exist, even in the presence of "perfect" risk scoring under a given contract.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aD12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG22 - Insurance • Insurance Companies • Actuarial Studies _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aI11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aI13 - Health Insurance, Public and Private _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aFinkelstein, Amy. _910464
700	1		_aKluender, Raymond.
700	1		_aSchrimpf, Paul.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w21304.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w21304
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21304
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c326818 _d285380