000 02331cam a22003737 4500
001 w21099
003 NBER
005 20211020105634.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu||||||||
008 210910s2015 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100 1 _aJin, Ginger Zhe.
245 1 0 _aIs No News (Perceived as) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure /
_cGinger Zhe Jin, Michael Luca, Daniel Martin.
260 _aCambridge, Mass.
_bNational Bureau of Economic Research
_c2015.
300 _a1 online resource:
_billustrations (black and white);
490 1 _aNBER working paper series
_vno. w21099
500 _aApril 2015.
520 3 _aThis paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple two-person disclosure game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold less favorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but receiver actions and beliefs suggest they are insufficiently skeptical about non-disclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback.
530 _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538 _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588 0 _aPrint version record
690 7 _aC9 - Design of Experiments
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aD8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aK2 - Regulation and Business Law
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aL51 - Economics of Regulation
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700 1 _aLuca, Michael.
700 1 _aMartin, Daniel.
710 2 _aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 _aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)
_vno. w21099.
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w21099
856 _yAcceso en lĂ­nea al DOI
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21099
942 _2ddc
_cW-PAPER
999 _c327023
_d285585