000			02207cam a22003857 4500
001			w20760
003			NBER
005			20211020105737.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2014 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aJiang, Liangliang.
245	1	0	_aCompetition and Bank Opacity / _cLiangliang Jiang, Ross Levine, Chen Lin.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2014.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w20760
500			_aDecember 2014.
520	3		_aDid regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public and regulators? We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with which banks restate financial statements. The results indicate that competition reduces bank opacity, enhancing the ability of markets and regulators to monitor banks.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aD22 - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aD4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG28 - Government Policy and Regulation _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG38 - Government Policy and Regulation _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aLevine, Ross. _915207
700	1		_aLin, Chen. _932405
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w20760.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w20760
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20760
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c327362 _d285924