000			02255cam a22003617 4500
001			w19883
003			NBER
005			20211020110014.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2014 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aAllen, Jason. _94740
245	1	0	_aSearch Frictions and Market Power in Negotiated Price Markets / _cJason Allen, Robert Clark, Jean-François Houde.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2014.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w19883
500			_aFebruary 2014.
520	3		_aThis paper develops and estimates a search and bargaining model designed to measure the welfare loss associated with frictions in oligopoly markets with negotiated prices. We use the model to quantify the consumer surplus loss induced by the presence of search frictions in the Canadian mortgage market, and evaluate the relative importance of market power, inefficient allocation, and direct search costs in explaining the loss. Our results suggest that search frictions reduce consumer surplus by almost $20 per month per consumer, and that 17% of this reduction can be associated with discrimination, 30% with inefficient matching, and the remainder with the search cost.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aL13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aL41 - Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aL81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade • e-Commerce _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aClark, Robert.
700	1		_aHoude, Jean-François.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w19883.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w19883
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19883
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c328229 _d286791