000 | 03033cam a22003617 4500 | ||
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001 | w18784 | ||
003 | NBER | ||
005 | 20211020110346.0 | ||
006 | m o d | ||
007 | cr cnu|||||||| | ||
008 | 210910s2013 mau fo 000 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 | _aQian, Yi. | |
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aUntangling Searchable and Experiential Quality Responses to Counterfeits / _cYi Qian, Qiang Gong, Yuxin Chen. |
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_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2013. |
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_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white); |
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490 | 1 |
_aNBER working paper series _vno. w18784 |
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500 | _aFebruary 2013. | ||
520 | 3 | _aIn this paper, we untangle the searchable and experiential dimensions of quality responses to entry by counterfeiters in emerging markets with weak intellectual property rights. Our theoretical framework analyzes the market equilibria under competition with non-deceptive counterfeiting and deceptive counterfeiting, respectively, as well as under monopoly branding. A key theoretical prediction is that emerging markets can be self-corrective with respect to counterfeiting issues in the following sense: First, counterfeiters could earn positive profits by pooling with authentic brands only when consumers have good faith in the market (believe in a low probability that any product is a counterfeit). When the proportion of counterfeits in the market exceeds a cutoff value, brands would invest in self-differentiation from the competitive fringe counterfeiters. Second, to attain a separating equilibrium with counterfeiters, branded incumbents upgrade the searchable quality (e.g. appearance) of their products more and improve the experiential quality (e.g. functionality) less, as compared to monopoly equilibrium. This prediction uncovers the nature of product differentiation in the searchable dimension and helps in analyzing the real-world innovation strategies employed by authentic firms in response to entries by counterfeit entities. In addition, the welfare analyses hint at a non-linear relationship between social welfare and intellectual property enforcement. | |
530 | _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers | ||
538 | _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. | ||
538 | _aMode of access: World Wide Web. | ||
588 | 0 | _aPrint version record | |
690 | 7 |
_aK42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aO31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aO34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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700 | 1 | _aGong, Qiang. | |
700 | 1 | _aChen, Yuxin. | |
710 | 2 | _aNational Bureau of Economic Research. | |
830 | 0 |
_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w18784. |
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856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w18784 |
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_yAcceso en lĂnea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18784 |
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_2ddc _cW-PAPER |
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_c329339 _d287901 |