000 02271cam a22003377 4500
001 w18783
003 NBER
005 20211020110346.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu||||||||
008 210910s2013 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100 1 _aEvans, David S.
_910090
245 1 4 _aThe Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses /
_cDavid S. Evans, Richard Schmalensee.
260 _aCambridge, Mass.
_bNational Bureau of Economic Research
_c2013.
300 _a1 online resource:
_billustrations (black and white);
490 1 _aNBER working paper series
_vno. w18783
500 _aFebruary 2013.
520 3 _aThis Chapter provides a survey of the economics literature on multi-sided platforms with particular focus on competition policy issues, including market definition, mergers, monopolization, and coordinated behavior. It provides a survey of the general industrial organization theory of multi-sided platforms and then considers various issues concerning the application of antitrust analysis to multi-sided platform businesses. It shows that it is not possible to know whether standard economic models, often relied on for antitrust analysis, apply to multi-sided platforms without explicitly considering the existence of multiple customer groups with interdependent demand. It summarizes many theoretical and empirical papers that demonstrate that a number of results for single-sided firms, which are the focus of much of the applied antitrust economics literature, do not apply directly to multi-sided platforms.
530 _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538 _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588 0 _aPrint version record
690 7 _aL19 - Other
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aL40 - General
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700 1 _aSchmalensee, Richard.
_920341
710 2 _aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 _aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)
_vno. w18783.
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w18783
856 _yAcceso en línea al DOI
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18783
942 _2ddc
_cW-PAPER
999 _c329340
_d287902