000 02325cam a22003617 4500
001 w17655
003 NBER
005 20211020110717.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu||||||||
008 210910s2011 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100 1 _aAlesina, Alberto F.
245 1 4 _aThe Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments /
_cAlberto F. Alesina, Dorian Carloni, Giampaolo Lecce.
260 _aCambridge, Mass.
_bNational Bureau of Economic Research
_c2011.
300 _a1 online resource:
_billustrations (black and white);
490 1 _aNBER working paper series
_vno. w17655
500 _aDecember 2011.
520 3 _aThe conventional wisdom regarding the political consequences of large reductions of budget deficits is that they are very costly for the governments which implement them: they are punished by voters at the following elections. In the present paper, instead, we find no evidence that governments which quickly reduce budget deficits are systematically voted out of office in a sample of 19 OECD countries from 1975 to 2008. We also take into consideration issues of reverse causality, namely the possibility that only "strong and popular" governments can implement fiscal adjustments and thus they are not voted out of office "despite" having reduced the deficits. In the end we conclude that many governments can reduce deficits avoiding an electoral defeat.
530 _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538 _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538 _aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588 0 _aPrint version record
690 7 _aH2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aH3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690 7 _aH5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
_2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700 1 _aCarloni, Dorian.
700 1 _aLecce, Giampaolo.
710 2 _aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 _aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)
_vno. w17655.
856 4 0 _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w17655
856 _yAcceso en lĂ­nea al DOI
_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17655
942 _2ddc
_cW-PAPER
999 _c330468
_d289030