000			02750cam a22003737 4500
001			w17538
003			NBER
005			20211020110736.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2011 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aWhelan, Kenneth T.
245	1	0	_aAdverse Selection and Incentives in an Early Retirement Program / _cKenneth T. Whelan, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Kevin F. Hallock, Ronald L. Seeber.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2011.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w17538
500			_aOctober 2011.
520	3		_aWe evaluate potential determinants of enrollment in an early retirement incentive program for non-tenure-track employees of a large university. Using administrative record on the eligible population of employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements, historical employee count and layoff data by budget units, and public information on unit budgets, we find dips in per-employee finance in a budget unit during the application year and higher recent per employee layoffs were associated with increased probabiliites of eligible employee program enrollment. Our results also suggest, on average, that employees whose salaries are lower than we would predict given their personal characteristics and job titles were more likely to enroll in the early retirement program. To the extent that employees' compensation reflects their productivity, as it should under a pay system in which annual salary increases are based on merit, this finidng suggests that adverse selection was not a problem with the program. That is, we find no evidence that on average the "most productive" employees took the incentive.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aI23 - Higher Education • Research Institutions _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aJ26 - Retirement • Retirement Policies _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aJ33 - Compensation Packages • Payment Methods _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aEhrenberg, Ronald G. _99797
700	1		_aHallock, Kevin F.
700	1		_aSeeber, Ronald L.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w17538.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w17538
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17538
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c330585 _d289147