000 | 02878cam a22003617 4500 | ||
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001 | w16258 | ||
003 | NBER | ||
005 | 20211020111120.0 | ||
006 | m o d | ||
007 | cr cnu|||||||| | ||
008 | 210910s2010 mau fo 000 0 eng d | ||
100 | 1 | _aSeim, Katja. | |
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aPublic Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: _bEvidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Entry Decisions / _cKatja Seim, Joel Waldfogel. |
260 |
_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2010. |
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_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white); |
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490 | 1 |
_aNBER working paper series _vno. w16258 |
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500 | _aAugust 2010. | ||
520 | 3 | _aWhile private monopolists are generally assumed to maximize profits, the goals of public enterprises are less well known. Using the example of Pennsylvania's state liquor retailing monopoly, we use information on store location choices, prices, wholesale costs, and sales to uncover the goals implicit in its entry decisions. Does it seek to maximize profits or welfare? We estimate a spatial model of demand for liquor that allows us to calculate counterfactual configurations of stores that maximize profit and welfare. We find that welfare maximizing networks have roughly twice as many stores as would maximize profit. Moreover, the actual network is much more similar in size and configuration to the welfare maximizing configuration. An alternative to a state monopoly would be the common practice of regulated private entry. While such regimes can give rise to inefficient location decisions, little is known about the size of the resulting inefficiencies. Even for a given number of stores, a simple characterization of free entry with our model results in a store configuration that produces welfare losses of between 3 and 9% of revenue. This is a third to half of the overall loss from unregulated free entry. | |
530 | _aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers | ||
538 | _aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. | ||
538 | _aMode of access: World Wide Web. | ||
588 | 0 | _aPrint version record | |
690 | 7 |
_aL13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aL21 - Business Objectives of the Firm _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aL3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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690 | 7 |
_aL81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade • e-Commerce _2Journal of Economic Literature class. |
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700 | 1 |
_aWaldfogel, Joel. _922560 |
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710 | 2 | _aNational Bureau of Economic Research. | |
830 | 0 |
_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w16258. |
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856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w16258 |
856 |
_yAcceso en lĂnea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w16258 |
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_2ddc _cW-PAPER |
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_c331864 _d290426 |