000			03485cam a22003497 4500
001			w15693
003			NBER
005			20211020111304.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2010 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aAcemoglu, Daron. _94444
245	1	0	_aInstitutions, Factor Prices and Taxation: _bVirtues of Strong States? / _cDaron Acemoglu.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2010.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w15693
500			_aJanuary 2010.
520	3		_aMany of the most pernicious economic institutions and policies create entry barriers or manipulate factor prices to transfer resources from entrepreneurs and workers to groups that hold political power. These inefficiencies partly result from the fact that direct and efficient fiscal instruments that can be used for taxation and redistribution of resources are absent. One might then conclude that increasing state capacity and expanding the set of available fiscal instruments should improve the allocation of resources by preventing the use of these inefficient, indirect methods of redistribution. This reasoning ignores the effect of greater state capacity and the change in the set of available fiscal instruments on the political equilibrium, however. Because the availability of more efficient means of taxation increases the potential benefits of controlling state power, it also intensifies costly political conflict aimed at capturing the control of the state. This indirect effect counteracts the benefits from more efficient taxation and may dominate the direct benefits. The paper establishes the possibility that the allocation of resources may deteriorate substantially in response to an autonomous increase in state capacity and the set of fiscal instruments. It also argues that in the British case, which is a key historical example that points to the central role of increased state capacity in economic development, this change was not autonomous; instead, it was an equilibrium response to changes in political institutions that placed better checks on the exercise of power by the executive. This reasoning suggests that the study of the effect of fiscal capacity and the evaluation of policies aimed at increasing state capacity in less-developed economies should be done in the context of dynamic models of political economy, in which fiscal capacity and political constraints are jointly determined.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aD74 - Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • Revolutions _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aO12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aP14 - Property Rights _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aP16 - Political Economy _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w15693.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w15693
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15693
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c332431 _d290993