000			02167cam a22003617 4500
001			w15568
003			NBER
005			20211020111324.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2009 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aAcharya, Viral V. _94454
245	1	4	_aThe Internal Governance of Firms / _cViral V. Acharya, Stewart C. Myers, Raghuram Rajan.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2009.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w15568
500			_aDecember 2009.
520	3		_aWe develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aG31 - Capital Budgeting • Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies • Capacity _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG34 - Mergers • Acquisitions • Restructuring • Corporate Governance _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aG35 - Payout Policy _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aMyers, Stewart C. _917344
700	1		_aRajan, Raghuram.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w15568.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w15568
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15568
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c332553 _d291115