000			02072cam a22003737 4500
001			w14703
003			NBER
005			20211020111600.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2009 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aDjankov, Simeon.
245	1	0	_aDisclosure by Politicians / _cSimeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2009.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w14703
500			_aFebruary 2009.
520	3		_aWe collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aH11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aK42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aP16 - Political Economy _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aPorta, Rafael La.
700	1		_aLopez-de-Silanes, Florencio.
700	1		_aShleifer, Andrei. _920697
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w14703.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w14703
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14703
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c333418 _d291980