000			03959cam a22004457 4500
001			w13725
003			NBER
005			20211020111853.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu||||||||
008			210910s2008 mau fo 000 0 eng d
100	1		_aBerman, Eli. _96118
245	1	0	_aReligion, Terrorism and Public Goods: _bTesting the Club Model / _cEli Berman, David D. Laitin.
260			_aCambridge, Mass. _bNational Bureau of Economic Research _c2008.
300			_a1 online resource: _billustrations (black and white);
490	1		_aNBER working paper series _vno. w13725
500			_aJanuary 2008.
520	3		_aCan rational choice modeling explain why Hamas, Taliban, Hezbollah and other radical religious rebels are so lethal? The literature rejects theological explanations. We propose a club framework, which emphasizes the function of voluntary religious organizations as efficient providers of local public goods in the absence of government provision. The sacrifices religious clubs require are economically efficient (Iannaccone (1992)), making them well suited for solving the extreme principal-agent problems faced by terrorist and insurgent organizations. Thus religious clubs can be potent terrorists. That explanation is supported by data on terrorist lethality in the Middle East.
520	3		_aThe same approach explains why religious clubs often choose suicide attacks. Using three data sources spanning a half century, and comparing suicide attackers to civil war insurgents, we show that suicide attacks are chosen when targets are "hard," i.e., difficult to destroy. Data from Israel/Palestine confirm that prediction. To explain why radical religious clubs specialize in suicide attacks we model the choice of tactics by rebels attacking hard targets, considering the human costs and tactical benefits of suicide attacks. We ask what a suicide attacker would have to believe to be rational. We then embed that attacker and other operatives in a club model. The model has testable implications for tactic choice and damage achieved by clubs and other rebels, which are supported by data on terrorist attacks in the Middle East: Radical religious clubs are more lethal and choose suicide terrorism more often, when they provide benign local public goods. Our results suggest benign tactics to counter terrorism by religious radicals.
530			_aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
588	0		_aPrint version record
690		7	_aD2 - Production and Organizations _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aD31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aH41 - Public Goods _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aH56 - National Security and War _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aH68 - Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aJ0 - General _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aJ13 - Fertility • Family Planning • Child Care • Children • Youth _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aO17 - Formal and Informal Sectors • Shadow Economy • Institutional Arrangements _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aO24 - Trade Policy • Factor Movement Policy • Foreign Exchange Policy _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
690		7	_aZ12 - Religion _2Journal of Economic Literature class.
700	1		_aLaitin, David D.
710	2		_aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830		0	_aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) _vno. w13725.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w13725
856			_yAcceso en línea al DOI _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13725
942			_2ddc _cW-PAPER
999			_c334398 _d292960